

# **U.S. Global Leadership Coalition**

**Investing in the Future: A Smart Power Approach to Global Leadership**

**Panel 2: Building the Peace – A Smart Power Approach to National Security**

**Moderator:**

**Kathleen Troia “KT” McFarland,  
National Security Analyst,  
Fox News**

**Speaker:**

**General James Cartwright, USMC  
Vice Chairman,  
Joint Chiefs of Staff**

**Date: Tuesday, July 12, 2011**

ADMIRAL (RET.) JAMES M. LOY: If I could recapture everybody's attention please and have you recapture your seats, we'll get on with our morning's program.

Good morning to you all. My name is Jim Loy, retired commandant of the Coast Guard, currently with the Cohen Group, very much involved with this notion of inducing economic value around the world by way of our clients. And I'm here this morning as a co-chair, along with General Mike Hagee of the USGLC's National Security Advisory Council. From those of you who know me from a slightly different job and you want to talk to me about taking your shoes off at the airport, we'll talk about that some other time. (Laughter.)

I'd like to chat just for a minute or two about the military side of the USGLC's agenda and some of the successes that we've been able to come up with over the course of the last year since this last conference. A number of announcers this morning have recognized that we have now reached a milestone of over a hundred senior flag and general officers that make up the National Security Advisory Council that recognize from their own many personal experiences the value of diplomacy and development and especially the economic side of both as it relates to this influence of U.S. – of the United States around the world and how valuable that may be.

For some it might seem just a slight bit unusual for men and women of the military to be speaking out on behalf of civilian power, but as Chuck Wald, my colleague, this morning mentioned at breakfast, the factor of a 10-to-1 ratio between dollars invested if you have to go to what he refers to as kinetic power as opposed to the smart power influence of keeping things from happening that don't need to be happening, that end up finding their way towards these very, very difficult challenges that we've watched around the world in the last 10 or 12 years.

We join some of the nation's most prestigious military leaders, currently still in uniform, who have recognized that the world is a very different place post-9/11, that the threats are very different in their makeup, and that they demand the attention of all of the tools that we can bring to bear with regard to that influence.

We've been engaged on a number of fronts to convey one very simple message. You heard Secretary Clinton just a moment ago refer to 1 percent or even less than 1 percent of our budget annually that is devoted to this notion of influencing things around the world as we in America would have them be influenced. And our one simple message has been that the international affairs budget in the face of all of these challenges that are currently being discussed in the White House and elsewhere, the international affairs budget remains an enormously critical part of our national security funding.

We have sent collective letters to the Congress, to all of the correct committees, to attempt to bring that to their attention one more time. We have all been in the media and on the Hill meeting with influential policymakers to ensure that military voices are being heard with respect to these issues; and we have participated in events across the country where we have found many, many supporters, both those who have served in uniform and those who simply understand the value of this international investment.

I also want to highlight an initiative that we began just at this conference one year ago, where veterans of all ranks and ages by way of the Internet have found their way to voice their support for precisely the same agenda. Veterans for Smart Power, co-chaired by General Wald and General Rich Hearney, members of the National Security Advisory Council, now number well over 16,000 who have committed by signature their personal understanding and commitment to the rightness of what it is that we're trying to do. They come from all 50 states. I think 20 states or more are represented here among us today, and we are delighted to have their continuing support as they provided it both in uniform in their days and now as citizens.

As I mentioned a moment ago we are actually honored today to have many veterans with us and in this audience, and I'd like to take a moment to acknowledge all of them. There are those who are members of the – (applause) – hold it. Hold that, just for a second. There are many, many members of our National Security Advisory Council here. There are members who have traveled from 20 states or more from across the country to join us this morning, and there are simply many who are veterans, plying this effort on international diplomacy and development, day in and day out. Would anyone who qualifies in any of those three categories, please stand and be recognized? (Applause.)

Let me represent the audience as a whole in thanking each and every one of you for your uniformed service and with the great honor that you offer to us by joining this effort.

Now I would like to direct your attention to the video screens to hear a bit more of the story of the military's commitment to a smart power agenda.

(Begin video segment.)

MR. : We represent 52 generals and admirals. We're saying that in order to be effective in this world, we need integrate all capabilities that represent our national power.

MR. : I am concerned that levels of funding for our State Department and USAID partners will not sufficiently enable them to build on the hard-fought security achievements of our men and women in uniform.

MR. : If we are looking to maintain some level of stability and keep whatever violence may occur within their borders and not have it exported to Western Europe, the United States, East Africa – wherever – then it's imperative that we – that we put some serious money into development.

ROBERT GATES: To truly harness the full strength of America requires having civilian institutions of diplomacy and development that are adequately staffed and properly funded.

ADMIRAL MICHAEL MULLEN: Secretaries Clinton and Gates have called for more funding and more emphasis on our soft power, and I could not agree with them more.

MR. : It is certainly this coalition of diplomacy, defense and development that goes into creating the peace for the long term.

MR. : We asked them what we could do for them, what they really needed, and this old man with this long white beard; he strokes it for a few minutes and says, you know, we could use a mating pair of American goats. And we all kind of look at each other, like, I don't have that. (Laughter.)

MR. : When General Petraeus and the 101<sup>st</sup> arrived in Mosul in April of 2003, one of the first things that General Petraeus did was post a note at the front door of this tactical operations center, and it said something along the lines of, what did you do for the people of Iraq today?

MR. : We can fight and win, but when it comes to getting that government back functioning and getting the elements of the society functioning again, the military needs a lot of help, and if you don't, it prolongs the use of the military.

MR. : Going in with a diplomatic and a development operation helps to stabilize some of these dangerous places in the world so that we're stopping conflicts before they begin.

MR. : Someone's miserable, and they have nothing to drink and nothing to eat and nowhere to work – why are they going to help you? Why are they going to help the foreign military walking around the street? Like, I don't think they are.

MR. : The notion of smart power allows you to better use the taxpayer's dollar in a wider sense. The reality is we're talking about 1 percent of the federal budget, 1 percent.

MR. : To me, the amount of money that we're really talking about is insignificant when you look at the issue that we are facing.

MR. GATES: Development is a lot cheaper than sending soldiers.

(End video segment.) (Applause.)

Thank you all, and if there – if we're all looking for a little catch phrase to take away, I think it's simply this: Talk's cheap, and it takes resources to get something done. So the rhetoric must be, in fact, followed by the investment of resources necessary to allow the stories being told by these gentlemen and ladies not to have to be repeated unnecessarily.

To introduce our first keynote speaker this morning, I would like to welcome Vice Admiral Bill Sullivan, distinguished member of the USGLC's National Security Advisory Council. Vice Admiral Sullivan is also representing L-3, as you heard earlier, one of the leading providers of intelligence communications and government services around the world and at home. L-3 is a premier sponsor for our year's conference. Would you please welcome Bill Sullivan? (Applause.)

VICE ADMIRAL (RET.) WILLIAM D. SULLIVAN: Well, thank you, Admiral Loy, and good morning to everybody. And I'd like to thank the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition for the honor and the opportunity to introduce our keynote speaker and panelists this morning.

L-3 is a proud sponsor of the USGLC and proud to be the premier sponsor for this 2011 Washington conference. We believe firmly that the work of the USGLC is important for our national security and our long-term economic interests, and we believe that in no other time in our nation's history has the concept of smart power and a whole-of-government approach to national security been more important than it is to us today.

It's an honor to first introduce General Jim "Hoss" Cartwright, the eighth vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I first met General Cartwright about a dozen years ago when we both served together in the Pacific, and our paths have crossed several times in the years since. General Cartwright has served 40 years in the United States Marine Corps, beginning as a fighter pilot and culminating in two four-star assignments as the commander of our U.S. Strategic Command and his current posting as the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the second highest-ranking officer in the United States military.

But I bet if you ask General Cartwright what he most enjoyed during those 40 years, he'd tell you it was fighting – flying fighter jets. In fact, in 1983, he was named the outstanding naval carrier aviator by the Association of Naval Aviation. Now, think about that for a second. How hard was it for all those Navy guys to choose a Marine for this honor?

General, on behalf of the USGLC National Security Advisory Council, thank you for your service to the country, and welcome.

It is also an honor to introduce today's moderator, highly respected journalist Ms. KT McFarland. Ms. McFarland is known as one of our nation's most thoughtful national security reporters. She appears regularly on Fox News and serves as a national security commentator for several radio programs on Fox, ABC, WVOX and WMAL. And I listen to WMAL on the way into work in the morning, and I enjoy listening to Ms. McFarland when she's on. She has a certain critical irreverence, which makes her commentary a lot of fun to listen to.

Ms. McFarland has held an impressive range of national security positions in government including serving as an aide to Dr. Henry Kissinger on the National Security Council, staff member on the Senate Armed Services Committee staff, senior speech writer for – to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and later as the principal deputy assistant secretary of defense and Pentagon spokesman. Now if you look carefully at her blouse, at her jacket, when she gets up here, you'll notice a small Navy pin on her lapel. KT's daughter is a 2008 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, and she's currently serving as a lieutenant junior grade in the precommissioning crew of LCS number four, USS Coronado. So we are very fortunate to have KT McFarland host a conversation with our keynote speaker, General Cartwright.

General Cartwright, Ms. McFarland, would you please come to the stage? (Applause.)

KATHLEEN TROIA "KT" MCFARLAND: Thank you.

Well, General, after that introduction, we both sound so great. I kind of wonder what we're doing here. I think we ought to get on a plane, go to Iowa and declare our candidacy for president of the United States.

GENERAL JAMES CARTWRIGHT: (Chuckles.)

MS. MCFARLAND: But, before we do that –

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: That would be Navy-Marine Corps team? (Chuckles.)

MS. MCFARLAND: Yeah, now that sounds like a pretty good team, what do you think? You'll walk on the water, and I'll salute. (Laughter.)

General, for much of the Cold War, which was my era, the major conflicts we fought were really actually right here in Washington, and they were across the Potomac River, with Foggy Bottom versus the Pentagon and the secretary of state battling the secretary of defense for everything from budgets to policy to primacy on national security issues. But in the end, we won the Cold War not because of our military, but – we did have superior military – but also because we had the stronger economy and we had more enduring alliances and a more attractive system of government, which the Eastern Europeans recognized.

But then we wanted peace Eastern Europe after the fall of the Iron Curtain because we sat in – sent in economic assistance and national building assistance. We didn't send in the Marines to occupy Eastern Europe. We learned those same lessons again in the wars of intervention we've fought since the Cold War, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq, the need for soft power as well as hard power to protect the nation's security, which we now call smart power.

So today rather than the secretaries of state and defense fighting with each other, as we've just seen with Secretary Clinton, this is now the "Kumbaya" moment. I mean, the two of them appear, Secretary Gates argues for Secretary Clinton's budget; the two of them talk about all of the tools of the toolbox of the United States. And I'm from New York, and we have the Miracle on the Hudson. I think this is the Miracle on the Potomac.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: (Chuckles.)

MS. MCFARLAND: One of the things that you have said when you stood with Secretary Clinton was as we make the transition in Iraq it's even more essential that we don't lose the gains that we've already made and the treasure that we've sacrificed. So it's important to resource the civilians who will take over as we leave, as the military departs in Iraq, and I assume, ultimately in Afghanistan. Would you please elaborate on that? How is the military mission giving way to the civilian mission?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Well, as we look at the approach of the end of this year, which is when nominally the military departs, what it's left behind will be associated with the embassy and with the State Department for train-and-assist type functionalities depending on the types of

equipment we've sold them, the types of skills that the Iraqi military will need as they go forward. They still have challenges in command and control, logistics, external defense type activities. And so as they develop those as a nation, there will be a partnership between State and DOD, but that leadership will be on the State side of the house. It will be on the civilian side of the house.

The skills that the civilians will bring go far beyond just the military activities, and we want to be in a position where the security of the country is sufficient that the civilians can in fact operate across the country. It's not completely there yet today, as we watch some of the challenges with security that face the Iraqis today. But by and large, their military and their police departments and whatnot are setting a condition where civilians can get out there into the population, American civilians, and assist and create the opportunities over the longer term and the skill sets to bring rule of law and realize it in their – in their culture, to bring the services that are needed to allow an economy to flourish – those types of activities that are best brought by the civilian side of soft power.

It's still going to be a balance issue. No country is completely homogenous; the security in certain areas is going to be a challenge compared to other areas. And so they'll be partnership and a balance activity there as we move forward. But my sense right now is that absence that capability and the capacity to do it – which I think is really the larger issue; we have the capabilities, it's a question of do we have the capacities to be able to do this on a scale – the opportunity to grow and flourish and move forward as nation for Iraq will probably not move as quickly as it could. Doesn't mean that it can't – that they won't be able to realize it on their own, but given the opportunity for us to assist and to move them along and help where they feel they need help, we'll have the opportunity to move them forward.

That's not only important inside of the country of Iraq; that is a regional issue, because the perception of Iraq by its regional neighbors and allies and how they play on the global stage is another part of their maturation as they go forward; again, best assisted by a soft power or a civilian-type activity, led by civilians.

MS. MCFARLAND: One of the things that I was struck with, is there was a recent poll of retired military officers – and this is not a normal military reaction – 90 percent of them agreed that in today's world, the strong military is not alone – is not going to protect America, just a strong military alone, that we need those tools of diplomacy and development. What do you think changed their mind? If you'd taken that kind of a poll 30 years ago you would have had a very different result.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Well, I think the reality of the world that we live in, and the complicated calculus that's there – you never like to say you yearn for the good old days of the Cold War. But it was two adversaries that well understood each other. They had moved to a point of treaties and exchanges and ways of building confidence with each other, signaling between each other when we were upset with somebody's action one way or the other.

The world that we live in today is nowhere near that subtle. And the combination of all of the elements of national power are necessary because one size does not fit all in the

relationships. What's important, for instance in the Cold War era, between two countries is not necessarily as important in a relationship between, say, the United States and Iraq or Iraq and its regional neighbors, et cetera. And so you need a much larger toolkit. That toolkit is probably best represented on the soft power side, not the military side.

You'd like to be in the position to prevent conflict; you'd like to be able to be in the position to raise deterrence to a level where conflict is the last resort and that military power's the last resort. And none of these conflicts are going to be solved by military action. They have to be solved by diplomacy. They have to be solved by a nation being able to handle its own sovereignty, create the capacity for rule of law, and to run an economy that allows its people to feed and house each other in a way that brings them a level of confidence inside that country that they can do their own thing. They may ask for assistance, we may have to fall back on military power if other things fail, but the reality is it's best to avoid that and try to find a way forward that allows them, the nation you're trying to assist, to do that for themselves.

MS. MCFARLAND: Mm-hmm. (Acknowledgement.) One of the things I think that have – the lessons that have come out of Iraq and Afghanistan were we were – our military went in and they're trained to fight, they're trained to kill. Ben West, who has – a renowned military historian has talked about, you know, the Marines are supposed to – they're warriors. They're not guys who drink three cups of tea.

But what has – what we've seen is – (laughter) – snake eaters, like – (inaudible) – reference. But what we've seen in Afghanistan and before that in Iraq, is we were asking our military people to do things that they historically weren't really trained to do. I mean, they were doing everything from getting the electricity turned back on. And as the Afghan and Iraqi governments collapsed, they were taking a lot of those roles that we normally think of as soft power roles.

Now, I think the question would be is, A, was that a good idea, or was it just borne of necessity, nobody else was there they had to do it; is this a new role for the military going forward; or is this something where we should see more military-civilian cooperation as we go into conflict areas?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Yes, to all of those.

MS. MCFARLAND: There you go.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: You know, I – as a Marine, particularly coming out of the Cold War, one of the mantras that we fell back on – and it's not just the Marine Corps, but it's the construct of a three-block war, wherein one block you can find yourselves trying to ensure that conflict doesn't break out; the next block you can find yourself in a skirmish where security's not good, but it's not safe for people to be around; and then in the third block you're in an all-out conflict.

And you're going to have to be able to operate in all three blocks, and they're all going to be in proximity. It's not going to be everything is maneuverable or fair and it's not going to be

everything is not. So the question becomes, when the transitions occur – when the security is in a position that is good enough to bring in the real experts, that’s what you want to do. But you have to fill the void between when the conflict is slowing, and set the conditions for the local population that what you’re bringing them is better than what they had. And you’re going to have to use the people that are there.

And so the great news here is that we can in fact fall back on those young 19-year-olds out there in the field improvising and innovating to find solutions. You know, it’s kind of the mindset of “Everything (sic) I Needed to Learn, I Learned in Kindergarten.” They are good citizens at the end of the day. And they can help. They can help people help themselves, they can bring skills and capability that others don’t have; and to the extent that the idea of small amounts of money to help clean up the streets, get the bazaars back open, get a little electricity running, help string the wires, things that you did when you were a kid, those skills help make that transition. It’s the transition part that is probably the most difficult because until the security is stable enough that you can bring in the experts and start to do it on scale and en masse, you’re going to have to use the young soldier, sailor, airman, Marine, to do that kind of work. The good news is they’re good at it. They’re sincere. They listen. You know, like the sign on the door in the Ops Center for Dave Petraeus, you know, what have you done for an Iraqi today?

I mean, those kinds of mindsets are absolutely essential. They represent our country, they represent the transition to security and this is a better condition than you had when you started. That mindset, bringing that in, is important. Then the transition that occurs, hopefully, starts to bring in the larger equipment, USAID – organizations like that that can really bring technical expertise, great innovation to the problem.

MS. MCFARLAND: So what you’re saying is you really need the military to go in first, fight the war, secure the area, and then slowly transition out of the civilian roles that they’ve had to take in the intermediate time and then turn them over to the NGOs and the civilians?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Presuming that you’re moving in during a conflict.

MR. MCFARLAND: Right.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: You’d like to prevent with the same skills, and then it’s the reverse: You have the technical experts there, and you bring in the soldiers, sailors, whatnot, to assist them to bring scale to the problem in a country, whether it is that you’re bringing doctors and dentists into an area that doesn’t normally be availed of those kinds of services and allowing them to help at large scale in places that are hard to get to for civilians – jungles, you know, out into the hinterlands, so to speak.

So it’s a trade back and forth. But the lead you’d like to be on the civilian side because that’s a prevention lead or it’s a recovery lead. But it indicates that there’s security, and that you can start to move at scale to help the country.

MS. MCFARLAND: OK. Let's take that – the whole notion of conflict prevention. What we've talked about prior to the – in the early part of your remarks and mine is civilian-military cooperation, one form of another, in a combat zone. What about conflict prevention?

One of the lessons that we saw at the end of World – at the end of the Cold War was not only did we win the war without firing a shot, but we won with peace because we did flood the area with, you know, constitutional lawyers who helped these newly emerging countries in Eastern Europe write constitutions, set up laws. We sent political consultants, for goodness sakes, to help them find candidates who were going to run in democratic elections. We sent accountants to show them double-entry bookkeeping and how to create free markets.

Is there that kind of opportunity in the Arab world right now, as we're seeing the Arab Spring? I know there's the conflict version, and then is there a way that we can use soft power, perhaps in combination with hard power, to do the same kind of thing we did at the fall of the Iron – of the Berlin Wall, and as Secretary Clinton was talking about, at the end of World War II?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: You know, as you look at the Arab Spring conflicts, there's a good study case there, both for the innovation that comes from social media and the implications of being able to move large masses to a cause very, very quickly. The challenge there is that they're able to do that and move to the cause – as soon as they remove the government and have to make decisions, they start to fall apart. It's at that transition where, potentially, we could use soft power to come in with the skills.

Take Egypt as an example. To come in and assist in constitution building, in trying to get representation, building an economy that's representative of the country rather than isolating the resources in a small percentage of the people for a maldistribution of the wealth – but starting to bring those ideas and rule of law and economics and all of those foundational activities and services to that country at that transition point.

You know, I mean, the reality is here is that, you know, like in Egypt, there is no Lech Walesa or Nelson Mandela to come in there, because the rulers really kind of eliminated that option in these various countries. So you're trying to fix years of activity that have denied wealth to a large part of the population, that have given you a large population of young people, young males 17-35 that are educated but can't feed their families or house their families because they just don't have access to the opportunity.

How do you start to change that? What skills are necessary to get in there immediately? And then what skills can come in at mass over time? That's a little of what we're trying to work our way through in those countries because they are doing it because they want to be sovereign. So there's an element of our arrival that has to be messaged in the right way to convey the issue that we're here to help, not take over, not to – not to occupy; but just what is it you need, what is it you're willing to take in the way of assistance, and how do we do it?

The great news with a country like Egypt is that over years the mil-to-mil has been exceptionally good. So it has set the conditions, both in the behavior of that military towards its

people, and it has set the conditions to allow Americans to come in and assist without looking like we're trying to direct, you know. And that nuanced approach really may have been facilitated by mil-to-mil but is a civilian activity.

MS. MCFARLAND: OK. You've talked in the past about demographics as destiny, if I can sum up, where you talk about that, I think, the testosterone levels of countries – (laughter) – where there are very large youth populations and a lot of unemployed males. And how – play that out for us in the Middle East.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: It's a growing population. It's not a declining – even though they are at war and in conflict, it is a growing population. They are educated, so this is not just people running around. They are educated, but the maldistribution of wealth in many of these countries does not allow them to provide for their families. So they have to turn to something to do then, and a lot of times it's being hired by a, you know, a militia or a group in the country that creates unrest trying to get the distribution they want, trying to find rule of law in communities where it doesn't exist today, and they impose their own rule of law to some extent.

The question there is not are they good guys or bad guys, but how do you bring to that nation – in the form that they're willing to accept inside their culture – the stability of rule of law, the opportunity to earn a living and feed your family in a way that makes sense, rather than having to grow poppies or join an army.

MS. MCFARLAND: OK. Before we go to audience questions, which we will do next, I want one last question. Where has it failed? I mean, if you look at the example of Pakistan, it's a country we've given a lot of aid to, military assistance, development assistance, economic assistance. And yet, they hate us more than ever. How do we avoid those kind of problems?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: You know, there's two sides – two parties in every activity. And so you're – you have to have somebody that's willing to be helped. But I think our biggest challenges have been in working the balance and the seams between what military might be able to do and what civilian power or soft power might be able to do, and the combinations.

So if you go back to any one of the villages, you know, in Iraq or Afghanistan where we've gone through this win-hold-build kind of activity, the win is a military activity. The transition to holding is the transition to soft power. How does that work? What skills do the military need to have in the early stages, and then how do they turn that over to a civilian type of control?

Historically what has worked great are partnership like Petraeus and Crocker or Austin and Jeffries (sic), where you've got two people who can in fact build a relationship, take the authorities and the powers that represent this nation, and employ them in a seamless way and understand the transitions. And understand one village may be in one stage, the one next door may be in a completely different stage. And they work together to do it. If you try to do it with a – you know, on date certain it tends to not work as well. So that's one of the challenges.

The other is Secretary Clinton and I spent a good amount of time on the Hill and in testimony talking about a concept that maybe we ought to fund national security rather than the Department of Defense or the Department of State and that that would give the flexibility to put the funds where the emphasis was needed – where's the leverage – and be able to make some adjustments in this in real-time rather than hard annual adjustments that go out and aren't responsive to the conditions on the ground. We've got to find a way to apply our soft power in a way that is actually responsive to the problem that we face, not the problem somebody wished we would face, you know, a year back when they built the budget.

MS. MCFARLAND: Mm-hmm. (In acknowledgement.) Great answer. OK. We're now going to go to audience questions. And we also, by the way, are encouraging people who are listening to this online to respond to us or ask questions via Twitter. New world. OK. And when you ask a question, please identify yourself for the General so he knows to whom he is speaking.

Q: Hi. I'm Kate Bunting. I'm actually with the USGLC, but I'm reading our Twitter feed in the back so I just wanted to ask the first question that came through Twitter. It's from Wilhelm Meierling. It says: The speakers are talking about stability through partnerships. What role do international NGOs play in these partnerships?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Yeah, that's – I mean, they are a critical element to – particularly on the preventative side, and to some extent on the consequence management side, the after, because they represent a way of bringing scale to the problem that it does not build inside the U.S. government, as an example, a standing army, that it's not always being employed. So in other words, you have the opportunity to bring people to the problem that are generally culturally sensitive, have a lot of experience in working in areas where they don't have a lot of infrastructure and security, and they have experience in capabilities and resources to bring to bear at scale in comparison to what we might be able to do, you know, say, inside the United States government.

Being able to do that and being able to bring them in and say, OK, here's the general plan, here's what we're trying to do in this country, here's where we can provide security for you, you now come back to us as an NGO and tell us where you're having problems, they become eyes and ears, they become the representatives out there of the effort to assist some nation, either in preventing a conflict or in remediating after a conflict in the refugee camps and whatnot and bringing people back into the country, getting the power stable, getting the food and water distributed until the nation can start to fend for itself.

MS. MCFARLAND: OK. I'm from Fox News and we're fair and balanced, so let me start with the left side of the room. (Laughter.)

Don't be nervous. Come right up and tell us who you are.

Q: Good morning. Atul Singh, founder and editor-in-chief of Fair Observer. It's a new journal covering global issues. And my question to you is taking off on the issue of Pakistan. And it's going to be a hard-hitting one.

So the question here is that you have suspended nuclear – I mean, you’ve suspended military aid. And after a prolonged period of both civilian and military partnership, you find yourself at odds with a longstanding ally, primarily because elements of the government now see their strategic interest not aligned with yours.

Now, picture the scenario wherein reportedly, the Saudis are not happy because they feel you threw Mubarak under the bus. So what happens if elements of the Saudi state turn against you? How do you factor in smart power for contingencies like this?

MS. MCFARLAND: General?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: I think that’s a great challenge that we’re going to face and are facing today out there. As you look at these conflicts and you watch them emerge, there are some of them that we have history in, say, the Pakistani equation, where we made a conscious decision for several years to not engage there. That meant that we didn’t have the personal relationships, whether they’d be mil-to-mil or civilian organizations or governmental organizations. And so we found ourselves coming back to a need and trying to then rebuild those things in the face of a very questioning society saying, are you really here – are you here for us or are you here for some other reason, and will you stay? I mean, those are all valid questions.

Now, we have worked hard to build that relationship, but we had no mil-to-mil relationship foundation. My counterparts, I knew, I went to school with. But really, the intermediate for us, the majors, lieutenant colonels, colonels – there’s nobody that knows each other in those forces. And those are the guys who run the fight day to day. That’s hard. There’s no counterpart for Secretary – now Panetta, then Gates – to talk to in that government. And really, we don’t have that kind of a relationship. The governments are fundamentally structured differently.

So we’ve had a real challenge in trying to rebuild that relationship in the face of activities that – you know, the cross-border incursions that occur that kill Americans – not necessarily sponsored, but they certainly come across the border; the issue with the raid in Abbottabad and how that was interpreted and how that may be interpreted as we go forward in other countries – this unilateral activity. All of those are issues that we have to work our way through.

You can only do it if you have a dialogue. So you’ve got to have the smart power side of this equation to create that dialogue, make it enduring and build the trust which is at the core of all of these issues, the trust that’s necessary to go forward.

MS. MCFARLAND: OK. This side of the room, which is to our right, your left.

Q: Hi. Anne Richard, International Rescue Committee. Thank you very much, General, for being here today and for the things you’ve said.

How do we ensure the U.S. government gets the balance right between using military tools to bring peace and civilian tools, especially when experts say, you know, the civilian side really should be doing the relief in the long-term development in some of these conflict-plagued countries? I heard you mention the need for the lead on the civilian side. You also said the military should not appear to take over or occupy countries. So if you've got military personnel who have energy, smarts, can-do attitude, how do you actually put a brake on their, you know, wanting to do so much and make sure that there is a handoff at the right time?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Yeah. I think there's two issues here. And I'll be critical of myself here. And the first is that, you know, the military tends to be a group of Type As. And so we'll all for working together as long as we're in charge, you know? (Laughter.) And – you know, and we have to get over that.

But it – where I've seen it being most successful is where there's a partnership all the way through. In other words, the partnership isn't built at the transition; the partnership between, say, a Petraeus and a Crocker started at the beginning and worked all the way through those transitions. And they were able to tell the people – their people, that they lead, OK, this is how we're going to work in this area, this is who's going to be in charge in this area, this is who's going to be in charge over here; and to make the adjustments in the strategy on a daily basis at contact. That's where I've seen the greatest success.

Where I've seen it not work as well is where we say, this is who's in charge, there's no partnership from the beginning, and then the transition is a very difficult thing and tends to be done with a – basically, a butcher knife, boom, you know, and off we go on to the other one and the handoff is not smooth. Therefore, the expectations of the population get mishandled, often, in that transition. And so expectations don't get met.

MS. MCFARLAND: On this side, please?

Q: Sir, thank you, first for your service. My name's Jim Kelly. I – retired major general in the Army, and I served both in Iraq and Afghanistan.

And my question is – and you talked a little bit to this, but my concern is, as the military leaves, there is this civilian surge, almost, that's going to have to take place with the State Department. Do you feel that they are properly resourced enough that they'll be able to fill those gaps and be able to sustain these very fragile governments that we're trying to help succeed?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Yeah. You know, each of those issues that you address, the transition, the fragility of the government, the seams are all – tend to be subjective judgments, you know?

And the question that we're – that we have to work our way through – one is that what we're doing here – we'll use Iraq as the issue, because I think that's what you're talking to in particular – is, what are the expectations of the Iraqi people? What are their expectations of how they want to govern themselves? What are their expectations of security? And how do we contribute to that?

We have to be able to fit into their model. The worse thing that we can do is to walk in and say, you must be like us. And the cultures don't match. They have to have a say in what their sovereignty is defined as, what their economy and their cultures do and how that interacts.

And so the question becomes, what are their – what are their needs? What do they want? And how do they want to develop their sovereignty? They may be fragile, but they are growing and they have expectations. And we've got to make sure that what we want to provide them is really things that they want. That's the first piece.

The second is, the security across the country is not uniform. So if we have to do – work in areas where the security is probably more contentious, you're going to need more military capacity or security capacity in some form. State Department could get that from private contractors or they could get it from the U.S. military. But what's that balance, and how are we going to manage that transition versus another area that may be very secure and is easy to walk the streets and be there day in and day out?

It's trying to work those seams, and the only way that I've seen it be successful is in partnerships inside of our presentation of capability to that country and being understanding of what they want and what they believe they need, not necessarily what we want to give them.

MS. MCFARLAND: OK. I think we have a question from Twitter world.

STAFF: We do, actually. This one – this one's actually an email question; it's on the screen. This is from Second Lieutenant John LaMonica (ph) from the U.S. Air Force. His question is: Many attribute the success of General Petraeus to the fact that he's as successful a soldier as he is a diplomat. How is the military making sure that the campaign objectives and execution, all the way down to the tactical level, are in line with diplomatic and civilian efforts?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: You know, I think that's critical, but it's back – it is back to this partnership issue. You could be the world's greatest diplomat, the world's greatest soldier, the world's greatest soldier and diplomat; if you can't bring it together, if you can't bring representation from both the soft power side or the civilian side and the military side together in a coherent way and in a way that is cooperative and team-building, then you're probably not going to be successful no matter how good you are at either one of them.

MS. MCFARLAND: OK, we have time for one last question from the audience. Sir?

Q: Good morning. My name is Bill O'Keefe; I'm with the Catholic Relief Services. And first, General, thank you very much for your leadership and for being here today.

We and other USGLC member organizations are working in frontline states in various parts of the world to help people, as Secretary of State Clinton said, to reach their God-given potential, and really, through that, to create conditions for peace, better governance, stability.

Meanwhile, though, Congress is cutting funding for the same sorts of activities in non-frontline states. And what can we do together to underscore the importance of those programs in non-frontline states and how those programs build conditions for long-term stability, peace, development and a better, safer world, as we like to say around here.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Yeah. You know, there's no nation, no single nation that's rich enough to just go out and do it themselves, so we have to create these partnerships. And the leverage in these partnerships, so-called building coalitions of the willing here, is to set the conditions. So what is it that these partnerships can provide from the – from the NGO side of the house? What is it that we can provide? Do we need to do the same thing, or can we provide more of something that you can't provide or vice versa? And how do we start to have that dialogue, which is unique probably to every country and every situation, and have the flexibility to do that? And for the most part, the flexibility side of that equation is really on the government's side and in the soft power side of the equation. You bring scale and mass to it.

And if we can put the two together in a partnership that doesn't necessarily have to be directive in nature but certainly has to be coordinated in nature – if we can do that, similar to, say, what we did in Haiti, when we – when USAID and the Department of Defense set the conditions for the NGOs to come in and actually do the work, that seems to be a very successful model.

Q: Thank you.

MS. MCFARLAND: Oh, OK. We have time for one last question. I'm going to exercise the prerogative of the chair and ask it. And I'm going to give you a choice.

So on one hand, you've talked about the need to adequately resource soft power – smart power. Do you feel so strongly about it that in the internal budget negotiations, you would be willing to make sure that it's funded out of somebody's budget, including potentially, the Defense Department's budget?

Now, that's one choice. You don't have to answer that question, because that could actually get you in some trouble.

The other question –

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: And I never get in trouble. (Chuckles.)

MS. MCFARLAND: And you never get in trouble. (Chuckles.)

The other question would be, really, do you have any last thoughts for the people in this audience who are involved with exactly the kind of thing you've been talking about: smart power?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: On both questions: The first – I mean, I've done that multiple times in front of the Congress to say that we need the money in the right place with the right

authorities. We don't need to be bickering about whose budget it's in, et cetera. We just need to get it applied; can you give us the flexibility to allow us to do that in whatever conditions – dual-key, you know, let the two secretaries talk, however you want to do it? But yes, there is great leverage in being able to take resources that currently on the DOD side and put them against prevention issues, building partnership capacity, those types of skills. That is essential; we've got to be able to do that. That's kind of number one.

The second question about what would I say here if I had the opportunity in a few seconds: The lessons that we have learned and the lessons that are coming to us now in the Arab Spring activities are starting to build a different construct in, let's say, the world order. We have focused and continue to focus on the nation-state, but the activities of the social media and the Arab Spring, the activities that we are starting to see start to go across those imaginary or real geographic boundaries between countries. And the need out there is broader than anyone of those countries, whether you talk about the young males unable to feed their families, et cetera; that is broader than anyone one country and often takes the shape that is not of a nation-state.

And we're going to have to understand, as we've brought out here with the NGO side of the equation, how we think about these problems more holistically – in other words, beyond any single nation-state border. If we don't start doing that, than we're playing “Whac-a-mole” country by country. And the one question out there about, how do you reconcile, how you talk to one country and then the next, becomes a huge problem for us. We've got to start to think more holistically about what's happening on this earth, about food, about demographics, about the ability to provide, you know, reasonable distribution of the wealth and resources in a way that people can flourish and realize their potential. If we don't do that, I have – I fear we do play “Whac-a-mole” around the globe and we'll be on the short end of that.

MS. MCFARLAND: Well, I just want to say, from my own perspective, General, thank you very much. Gilbert and Sullivan has a great line about the modern major general. Well, you a general; you're not a major general. You have two more stars. But I've got to say that I'm really impressed with the ability that you've got, not only, obviously, as a warrior, but to drink the three cups of tea and to see things from that side as well.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Thank you.

MS. MCFARLAND: Congratulations.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Thanks. (Applause.)

ADM. LOY: KT, let me assure you that he – in the Pentagon, he is a “major” general.

MS. MCFARLAND: Major general. (Chuckles.)

ADM. LOY: One of the “major” generals.

Let me say from the audience and from all of us at USGLC, thank you to both of you for a stimulating conversation on the stage and response to the questions from the audience. We thank you very, very much for that.

If there's a common link that I've heard in those questions and the answers, it is a quest for recognizing the leadership dimensions and parameters of this post-9/11 security environment that we all find ourselves in very much. Are we still trying to even understand it, let alone figure out the answers to those things, such things as collaboration and risk-based judgment and agility and adaptability or the dimensions of this post-9/11 security environment that we have to find a way to breathe into those young people that will be the majors and colonels of the day, that will find themselves towards the generals and ambassador positions of the future?

For the audience, let us have one more moment of appreciation for our panel.  
(Applause.)

We're going to take a short break and we will ask each of you to religiously be back in your chair about 1100, as we will by then have Senator Daschle and Secretary Ridge waiting in the wings. Thank you very much.

(END)